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Justice as Harmony:
The Distinct Resonance of Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin’s
Juridical Genius
Marcus Moore

PROLOGUE
Introduction
The recent retirement of the internationally esteemed and nationally
treasured Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, has provided an
occasion to reflect on the remarkable achievements of her long and
brilliant career. A tremendous outpouring of tributes, both in public and in
private, accompanied the initial announcement, with encores on the date of
her retirement and upon her final departure from the Court following the
release of judgments under reserve. The substance of these tributes is so
diverse, and the sources so traverse the expanse of the legal community
and of society at large that they remind us of our great fortune in having
her as the leader of our justice system for so long. Of her career as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is commonly noted that she was
the first female to ascend to that post, and the longest-serving of any holder
of it.1 But beyond facts and figures such as these, her many qualities that
have been praised, professional and personal, are the true measure of her
distinction. They make clear that this outpouring of praise is not homage to
high office, but gratitude for the particular way in which she discharged the

Clarendon Scholar, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, and Assistant Professor, Allard
School of Law, University of British Columbia. Marcus is a former law clerk to Chief Justice
McLachlin. His research is supported by the Margaret Thatcher Trust (Somerville College, Oxford)
and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author would like to
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1
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (June 12, 2017) online: SCC: <https://scc-csc.
lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/5552/index.do>.
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duties of that office and delivered on its opportunities. It is, quite simply,
admiration of Beverley McLachlin.
Granted the special privilege of serving as her law clerk, I benefited
from the experience of witnessing these qualities at work. It was
instructive to be able to perceive their value to the court-side of the
adjudication process, to management of the institutional and interpersonal
environments of a collegiate court, and to charting how to navigate her
concomitant roles of public face of the judiciary and high-ranking civic
leader. From an internal perspective, it was very evident how and why the
qualities she cultivated were so vital to the success she achieved in the
various aspects of the office of chief justice. Equally apparent was how
much could go wrong in all these spheres, absent those qualities.
Praise of Chief Justice McLachlin often focuses, perhaps unsurprisingly,
on virtues widely recognized: Integrity, dedication, honed intellect and
reason, compassion, modesty, fairness, respect for tradition, common
sense, and judgment are hardly novel, although not so easy to consistently
adhere to, and not so commonly coinciding in a single person. In trying to
understand what enabled her extraordinary achievements, much may be
said of her nurture of these and other well-known attributes of excellence
in judging, management, and leadership.
But are there other aspects of the conduct of her work that are less
commonly perceived, at least in this context, and that may have contributed
to the widespread and overwhelming admiration her career has earned? If
so, arguably these aspects are harder to identify, articulate, and explain.
And yet, because they are less appreciated, they may be among the
qualities of greatest potential value to illuminate for the benefit of future
jurists and professional leaders, as well as the citizens they serve.
Intricate Principle
One feature that has often been said to define the McLachlin Court is
its decisions’ degree of consensus among the judges within it as well as
spectrum of support among the public outside it. Emmett Macfarlane
notes, for instance, the frequency of its unanimity, in “sharp contrast” to
some other courts, and a puzzle which “the predominant political science
models of judicial behaviour are at pains to explain”.2 Not uncommon, it
seems, are courts that have suffered and perhaps perpetuated greater
2
Emmett Macfarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Judicial Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), at 122-23 [hereinafter “Macfarlane”].
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fractiousness, whether rooted in ideology, rivalry, personality conflicts,
or simply pressures of the job. Close at hand, Macfarlane cites the
sharply divided Supreme Court of the United States as an example.3
Closest of all, Kirk Makin reports that the Supreme Court of Canada,
prior to Beverley McLachlin’s move to the centre chair, itself “had
become increasingly factionalized, overworked and demoralized”.4
Yet, the McLachlin Court’s distinct pattern of decisions boasting
broad internal and external support was typically not a project of political
pragmatism — Bismarck’s realpolitik — although Beverley McLachlin
certainly exhibited the exceptional practical sense essential in any
masterful judge. The jurisprudence that emerged from the McLachlin
Court, and the processes and practices that produced it, were profoundly
principled. While not identifiable with any singular school of thought,
her own opinions are replete with principle. In different cases, her
judgments might promulgate normative ideals, prefer ‘incremental’
evolution, or address values’ wider implications only in obiter. But in all
cases, her judgments reveal themselves keenly alive to the principles
involved, devoted to understanding each’s relevance to a suitable
resolution, and prudently thoughtful about the implications for foreseeable
future cases. This is not to suggest these opinions are somehow devoid of
error or sans shortcomings — there can be, as Justice Robert Jackson
counselled, no doctrine of judicial infallibility;5 and it is a truism to say
that an opinion is only as good as the record on which it is based. But the
judgments of Chief Justice McLachlin are always to be found earnestly
and incisively probing the various values at issue. From this especially
deep engagement with principle, not from pragmatism, springs the
complex pattern that characterizes the McLachlin Court’s jurisprudence
and defies ideological identification.6
A Question of Balance?
Beyond it representing a complex pattern, how can we better understand
the broadly supported and deeply principled jurisprudence of Chief Justice
3

Id., at 123.
Kirk Makin, “Shedding some light on the decline of a lion in winter”, The Globe and
Mail (May 6, 2011) online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/shedding-some-lighton-the-decline-of-a-lion-in-winter/article578974/>.
5
Brown v. Allen, 344 US 443 (1953).
6
Cynthia Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court
of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), at 207-209 [hereinafter “Ostberg”].
4
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McLachlin, in order to draw guidance from it that may be valuable to future
jurists and professional leaders serving the public interest?
One metaphor that had sometimes been used to describe her
characteristic work was that of balance. Peter McCormick, for instance,
wrote:
The central notion … [f]or the McLachlin Court, it is balancing ...
Balancing of elements within rights, balancing within ideas like
fundamental justice, and balancing between rights: “balance” is a
powerful metaphor. Still it involves the Supreme Court in much more
complex exercises than finding clear-cut rights violations resulting in
invalidity, or in “bright-line” standards that unambiguously signal what
the court will be doing in similar or related cases.7

“Balance” was a word Chief Justice McLachlin often used, not only
in judgments but in official speeches.8 And although described by
McCormick as bearing special distinction within the McLachlin Court,
balance is a long-familiar legal notion. Indeed, dating to antiquity, the
personification of justice — today marking the entrance to the Supreme
Court of Canada and courthouses the world over — is the goddess
Justitia, whose iconography involves scales of balance.9
Before joining the Chambers of the Chief Justice, the time-honoured idea
of balance coloured my impression of her vision of justice. It was a quality
I was perhaps disposed to perceive, having relied on it in other contexts.10
To my surprise, however, I wound up finding this impression to be wrong.
Plurality and Unity
Based on my experience in the Chambers, I concluded that the aim
that she was pursuing, although in important ways overlapping with
balance, was more sophisticated and difficult than ably balancing
relevant interests. It also appeared that this higher aim was a constant;
and not just a routine feature, but fundamental to her approach. The
Chief Justice, colleagues and aides, and others who closely followed her
7
Peter McCormick, The End of the Charter Revolution: Looking Back from the New
Normal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 166 [hereinafter “McCormick”].
8
See SCLR Vol. 87, Table A.
9
The rendering outside the Supreme Court of Canada is rare in omitting the feature of her
visibly holding aloft the scales of balance.
10
In my book on athletic aspiration, I described it as part of an essential foundation for
sustainable striving: “Chapter 6: Good Health & Balance” in Making It in Hockey: What You Should
Know, from the Experts and Pros (Toronto: H.B. Fenn & Co., 2009), at 69-76.
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work, all seemed to have a palpable sense of this quality and of the
guidance it gave. Yet, there was no term for it consistently used and able
to convincingly capture it.
Beyond balance, Chief Justice McLachlin had employed various
concepts in different contexts to describe either the challenge, or the
aim, or the exercise called for. For instance, in seeking to highlight the
dynamic aspect, she stated that “a more appropriate metaphor may be
that of equilibrium”.11 Elsewhere, instead of balancing multiple
interests, she foresaw blending them as a “mélange”12 or an
“amalgam”.13 In another discourse, she described the “clash of forces”
among the issues in dispute as a “dialectic [that] must reach
synthesis”.14 Frequently, her remarks also invoked a holistic concern,
hence describing the judicial aim as being “decisions that best represent
the interests of the community as a whole”.15 Combining the notions
evoking diverse strands with those evincing concern with integration,
another metaphor Chief Justice McLachlin favoured was a “tightly
woven fabric”.16 Like balance, these various other concepts overlapped
in some way with the quality I described as intuitively understood and
emulated by those in her orbit. They were not unrelated. There had to
be a “general organizing principle … which underpins and informs the
various” aspects invoked by these several metaphors, “in various
situations and types of relationships”.17 However, a comprehensive
conceptualization of it, which could be used to transmit it to others
outside the sphere of her significant influence, still seemed elusive.

11

Beverley McLachlin, A Canadian judgment: the lectures of Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin in New Zealand, April 2003 (Christchurch: Centre for Commercial & Corporate Law,
2004), at 35 [hereinafter “NZ”].
12
Beverley McLachlin, “Defining Moments: The Canadian Constitution”, Remarks, online:
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Constitution”].
13
Beverley McLachlin, “Canadian Rights and Freedoms: 20 Years Under the Charter”,
Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “20 Years”].
14
Beverley McLachlin, “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian
Perspective” in Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in
Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy (Montréal: MQUP, 2014), at 22 [hereinafter “Religion”].
15
Beverley McLachlin, “Judges in a Multicultural Society” (October 2003), online:
<www.lsuc.on.ca/media/mclachlin_judges_multicultura_society.pdf> at para. 8 [hereinafter
“Multicultural”].
16
See e.g., Supreme Court of Canada, The Supreme Court of Canada and its Justices 18752000 (Toronto: Dundurn, 2000), at 6 [hereinafter “SCC”].
17
Bhasin v. Hrynew, [2014] S.C.J. No. 71, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, at para. 33
(S.C.C.).
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Interpretation: An Adjudicative Microcosm?
One activity that is a staple of a court’s work is interpretation. The
Chief Justice enjoys this task. She seems to appreciate its elements of
discovery, of creativity (in the sense of problem-solving, not invention),
and of expressiveness (Montesquieu’s bouche de la loi).18 Yet, she
broaches the task with great humility. Far from drawing impressionistic
conclusions, then going through the prescribed formalities for the sole
sake of justification, she treats it as a quest: not knowing where she will
end up until the journey’s end. Sometimes, that meant a different conclusion
even than she anticipated following the post-hearing conference. As
McLuhan said that the medium is the message,19 McLachlin might
have said that the process is the point.20 But that process required her
active participation at every step in order to arrive at the best possible
interpretation.
The interpretive philosophy embraced by the Supreme Court of
Canada, and employed by Chief Justice McLachlin, was termed by
Elmer Driedger simply the “modern” principle:21
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.22

But what it calls for is harmony among the various interpretive
considerations: text, context, scheme, and purposes. Out of that harmony,
sounds the interpretation sought.

18
See e.g., Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003) 88 [hereinafter “Dickson”].
19
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: Mentor,
1964).
20
Indeed, speaking of the judicial task generally, she has said that “public support for the
courts is not tied to the popularity of any one opinion; rather, it appears that public approval of the
Court is tied to the perceived integrity of the judicial process”: Beverley McLachlin, “The Role of
Judges in Modern Society”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Role of
Judges”]. See also her statement, in the Conclusion to this volume, “I’ve always been a process
person”: “Kirk Makin in Conversation with The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin — Chief
Justice McLachlin in Her Own Words”, at 330.
21
Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd. edition (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983).
22
Id., See e.g., Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.); Bell
ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26
(S.C.C.): “Driedger’s modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred
approach to statutory interpretation across a wide range of interpretive settings”.
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Hence, when in a mentoring moment the Chief Justice said to me
“interpretation is everything”,23 I wondered whether harmony might be a
better conceptualization than balance of her approach to legal problemsolving overall: Was it a search for a harmonious resolution of the legal
issues posed? For a resolution that would achieve harmony among the
legitimate considerations to be accounted for?
Harmony was indeed another term she used in cases and public lectures
discussing legal ideals.24 Moreover, the various other conceptualizations, it
seemed to me, converged on it. Meanwhile, the more I studied her work,
whether the product or the process, the more that harmony emerged as a
theme — often not explicit (interpretation being one exception), but very
often powerfully implicit. To what extent was this particular conception a
conscious focus for her, versus a quality achieved in practice, reflecting
an acute appreciation at some subconscious level? I don’t know. But
whether or not it was consciously so prominent for her, or so perceived
by others, for me at least, it echoed the intuitive understanding of her
approach previously mentioned.
Justice as Harmony
Beyond merely presenting a different metaphor, how might harmony
offer a better conceptual vehicle than balance for understanding Chief
Justice McLachlin’s framework for resolving legal problems? Two broad
answers can be posited, which should emerge more clearly throughout the
course of this article. First, harmony constitutes a different aim — one that
is more complex and ambitious than balance. Indeed, to achieve harmony
might well mean, in some cases, a commensurate imbalance, or require in
other cases the striking of several simultaneous balances of different
factors operating at different levels. Harmony further supplies an answer
23
Her public remarks confirm such an understanding of interpretation as definitive of the
judicial role: “The task of the judiciary is to interpret the laws passed by the legislatures as well as the
common law, and to resolve disputes … in accordance”, and quoting Chief Justice Dickson that “it is
only where the law is interpreted by an independent judiciary with vision, a sense of purpose, and a
profound sensitivity to society’s values, that the rule of law [is] safe”: Beverley McLachlin, “The
Supreme Court of Canada”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “On SCC”].
Where values are at variance, she adds, “the judge must become the interpreter of difference”:
Beverley McLachlin, “Second International Conference on the Training of the Judiciary”, Remarks,
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Training Judiciary”].
24
See e.g., 20 Years, supra, note 13; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Haida”]; B010 v. Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, 2015 SCC 58, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.).
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as to why (and when) it might be desirable to strike a balance: namely,
where it is necessary to achieve harmony among conflicting legitimate
considerations. Second, the process for pursuing harmony as an aim is
significantly more diverse and sophisticated than balancing. In some
circumstances, it might well involve balancing. But in others, it will call
for different legal skills such as reconciliation, accommodation, a search
for common ground, or the negotiation of compromise.
If these hypotheses harbour some truth, then the concept of harmony
as a way of understanding a characteristic quality of the Chief Justice’s
oeuvre is worthy of study. In this article, I hope to break initial ground on
that, relying primarily though not exclusively on public lectures by the
Chief Justice, wherein she had opportunities to illuminate what she saw
as the functional objectives, outlook, and operating procedures that lay
behind the output of the Court — being the judgments themselves. As the
discussion thus far may suggest, my examination and interpretation of
these is from the standpoint of searching for the best way of understanding
the challenge of resolving legal problems strictly in terms of consistency
with my experience as an apprentice to Chief Justice McLachlin. I will
not address conceivable evolution, experimentation, or variation in her
style in conflict with that, much less address judicial aims and processes
as a general field of inquiry, or the broader general proposition of legal
problem-solving.
With that in mind, this first foray will address two overarching questions:
One is to explore the nature of the pursuit of harmony as an averred theme
in Chief Justice McLachlin’s work. Along the way, it must be clarified
what harmony means in that context, and how it can be pursued. The
other question concerns harmony’s potential wider significance for law
and for society. To the extent it captures something significant in Chief
Justice McLachlin’s philosophy, how does it compare to other common
approaches to the judicial task? Should harmony be better appreciated as
a judicial aim, as a legal virtue, as a priority of civic leadership, as a
vision and process of seeking justice in our society?
Structure of this Article
The sequence of this exploration will proceed as follows: Part I
begins by reflecting on the relationship between harmony, law, and the
pursuit of a just social order. Harmony’s association with the just order is
surveyed, and the question of how our legal system leaves room for

(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d)

JUSTICE AS HARMONY

11

harmony is addressed. Part II fixes on the nuts and bolts of what
harmony means in this context as an aim of legal problem-solving, and
what process is entailed in pursuing it. Part III compares it to other
approaches to resolving legal problems. Different applications of it are
overviewed in Part IV, with examples or relevant commentary by the
Chief Justice. Part V briefly considers a few potential factors in Beverley
McLachlin’s perfection of this technique.

I. HARMONY, LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF A JUST SOCIAL ORDER
1. Harmony’s Association with the Just Social Order
Far from a novel or exotic notion, harmony has throughout the world
and throughout history been central to many cultures’ conception of a
just order. Undoubtedly, harmony has somewhat different meanings
across cultural contexts. But certainly there appears to be a significant
overlap among these, a fact reflected in the sharing of that terminology.
And the concept itself (in any of these incarnations) is sufficiently broad
as to allow us to focus on a common core without undue fear that all
meaning is thereby lost. For these reasons, I prefer to rely on common
understandings, despite or perhaps because of potential variations, and
shall not endorse any particular conception or definition of harmony.
While a comprehensive account of the conceptual life and work of
harmony across cultures is far outside the ambit of this work — and no
doubt to be better accomplished by an anthropologist than a lawyer — a
brief look at a few examples of harmony’s association with different
cultures’ ideal of a just order is important here for the purpose of
illustrating how remarkably pervasive that association is.
In Aboriginal-American cultures, it has been said that the way to
understand “traditional Indigenous legal orders [is] as embodiments of
distinctive Indigenous approaches to restoring harmony within
communities”:25
Indigenous legal orders in Canada are diverse; each stems from a
particular vision of ecological order and each is rooted in a distinct
language, tradition and worldview. Together, though, the sources
indicate that four important things must be kept in mind when
approaching the legal traditions of Indigenous peoples on this land.
25
Michael Coyle, “Indigenous Legal Orders in Canada — a literature review” (2017) 92
Law Publications, v 4 [hereinafter “Coyle”].
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First, those traditions tend to place a central focus, not on individual
“rights”, but on maintaining harmonious relationships among members
of the community and between the community, the land, and other lifeforms ...26

That this understanding of harmony reaches well beyond social
harmony is highlighted by the fact that the “traditional Indigenous focus on
harmonious relationships generally includes accountability to the natural
world, a stewardship-like concept”.27 Accordingly, the fundamental values
of the Cheyenne people of the Prairies/Great Plains are said to include
“respect for the spirit world; desire for harmony and well-being in
interpersonal relationships; desire for harmony and balance with nature”.28
And for the Sto:ló people of British Columbia, the key term
“qui:quelstóm” is translated as “a way of living in harmony”.29
Harmony has also been closely associated with visions of the just
order in Eastern cultures. For instance, “[t]he popularity of ‘harmonious
society’ in China has deep political, economic and cultural roots”.30 In
that context, the association encompasses, notably:
… traditional Chinese perspectives on dispute and dispute resolution,
which are deeply shaped by Confucian doctrines, especially the concept
of “harmony” … “Harmony”, in Confucian understanding, means “an
orderly combination of different elements, by which a new unity comes
into being”. This new unity brings a state of peace and stability to the
relationships between human beings and nature, between different
hierarchies of society, and between individuals. In this sense, a
harmonious society does not eliminate controversies but instead
maintains them to a manageable extent and solves them in effective
ways.31

In disfavour during China’s Cultural Revolution, this traditional
perspective has enjoyed a “resurgence” in the 21st century “throughout
the entire legal system in China”.32 The official government aim of
“constructing ‘socialist harmonious society’” is a “restating” of the
traditional perspective on “the importance of maintaining harmonious
26

Id., at vi.
Id.
28
Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, “Aboriginal Concepts of Justice” in Report of
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, v1 (1999), online: <http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html>.
29
Coyle, supra, note 25, at 7.
30
Wei Pei, “Harmony, Law and Criminal Reconciliation in China: A Historical
Perspective” (2016) 9 Erasmus L.R. 18, at 20.
31
Id.
32
Id., at 20-22.
27
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relationships between individuals, between the government and people,
between human beings and nature, and between China and foreign
countries”.33
Religious cultures have also perceived a connection between harmony
and the just order. For example, in Christian teaching:
Justice toward men disposes one to respect the rights of each and to
establish in human relationships the harmony that promotes equity with
regard to persons and to the common good.34

This notion is elaborated in the theology of Aquinas, which sees the
virtue of justice as distinct from the other virtues by its social, rather than
individual, vocation. Its first branch, “legal justice”, provides that
“everyone who is a member of a community stands to that community as
a part to a whole … For this reason, we should expect the good
community to enact laws that will govern its members in ways that are
beneficial to everyone”.35 The second branch, “distributive justice”,
dealing with the apportionment of goods and responsibilities within the
community, “seeks to preserve equality” which is “not a matter of equal
quantity but ‘due proportion’”.36
Harmony is also a term often used in association with order and
justice in attempting to translate complex concepts within the core of the
Dharmic faiths.
Beyond religious groups, harmony has further been associated with a
salubrious order in the context of other sorts of communities. Two such
contexts recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada include the
family37 and labour.38
The picture in “official” Western legal systems is more complicated.39
Harmony figures in notable philosophies, from the ancient Greeks (per
33

Id., at 28.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, at para. 1807.
35
“Thomas Aquinas: Moral Philosophy” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online:
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-moral/> [hereinafter “IEP”].
36
Id.
37
See e.g., Young v. Young, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at 80 (S.C.C.);
Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] S.C.J. No. 41, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
38
See e.g., Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R.
1016, 2001 SCC 94, at paras. 172, 192 (S.C.C.).
39
I am referring here to law associated with sovereign states, and the statement therefore
excludes what, from a legal pluralism standpoint, might be viewed as Western non-state “legal
systems”. I also exclude forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, where the
concept of harmony may operate more straightforwardly. While interestingly, such forms of ADR
are increasingly being co-opted into playing roles in the official legal system … that movement, in a
sense, is part of the larger point.
34
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the discussion in Section II.1(a) below), to Aquinas (mentioned above),
to Kant (referenced in Section V). Philosophies involving harmony have,
in turn, been influential in Western legal thought. Mediated by these
philosophies, harmony has played a central role in defining justice,
where justice is the aim of the legal system, similar to that association in
other cultures. Beyond that, the earlier philosophies were a source of
important constructs of Western law: due (and not undue) punishment in
Criminal Law; proportionality in Constitutional Law; restitution in
Private Law, as merely a few examples.40 The earlier and modern
philosophies also remain prominent in contemporary academic theory.
Thus, in an indirect and often implicit way, harmony has had
considerable impact in Western law.
But within the legal system itself, harmony’s role is confined to the
extent to which it is embodied in the rules that comprise the system. The
extent of its embodiment in the rules is limited by the strong
individualistic and weak communitarian focus of Western law.41
Moreover, the system does not foresee a distinct role for harmony
beyond the rules. Western legal systems’ elaborate sets of rules are
treated as sufficient, at any given time, to answer any question that
requires a legal answer. The inboard presumption is that there is no need
for a system to have recourse, distinct from the rules, to harmony as a
guiding concept: to whatever extent harmony should bear on legal
answers, it has been incorporated in rules which apply it in a more
precise manner to more specific problems.
But as discussed in the succeeding Section I.2, the rules are — and
will forever be — insufficient. Thus, although the system aspires to a just
order, associated as elsewhere with harmony, the fiction of the system’s
claim to “completeness” cuts it off, in resolving insufficiencies, from
further nourishment by the concept in aspiration of which the system is at
some level considered to be born, and that the rules to some extent
embody. In this way, the influence of harmony is attenuated in official
Western legal systems.
This is acutely significant in the context of adjudication. As detailed
in the next section, Chief Justice McLachlin has emphasized that the
judicial function serves to resolve insufficiencies in the rules as they
constantly reveal themselves in the legal problems that underlie disputes
40
On the claim that harmony was a source for proportionality, see Thomas Poole,
“Proportionality in Perspective”, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 16/2010.
41
I thank Professor Helge Dedek for this important observation, the factors behind which
are outside the scope of the present article. This facet is touched on again within Section II.1 below.
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calling for adjudication. From the standpoint of the system’s aim of just
order, associated with harmony, in turn concerned with the proper
relationship among elements of the system and between elements and the
whole, the insufficiency to be resolved in each case represents a
particular constellation of elements whose proper interrelationships had
not been worked out by the system — a disharmony. The judicial
function itself, the Chief Justice adds, cannot be reduced to rules, but
involves an essential human element. Inevitably, that element falls to the
independence of each judge to decide how they will conceive of and
execute. Induced perhaps by the adversarialism of Western legal systems’
focus on disputation (as discussed in Section III), adjudication is often
approached through the lens of conflict: ending the dispute by taking
sides, but meanwhile compounding the system disharmony. By contrast,
Chief Justice McLachlin’s characteristic efforts appear consistent with a
philosophy of striving to resolve legal problems in a way that would
restore harmony to the system.
2. The Complementarity of Harmony and Legal Rules within a Just
Legal Order
If harmony has, at least thus far, not played a role as a distinct and
guiding principle within Western official legal systems, how is it that it
could have characterized the approach of Chief Justice McLachlin, as
suggested? The almost universal acclaim for the way in which she
performed her official duties excludes any figment that she might have
short-changed the expectations incumbent on a leading jurist of such a
system and instead followed some other legal tradition in what, as legal
transplants go, would amount to a brain transplant. If my claim
concerning Chief Justice McLachlin’s pursuit of harmonious resolutions
is at all accurate, the praise she has earned also implies a strong
complementarity between what an official Western legal system requires
and what a philosophy aiming to achieve harmony allows, when used in
synchrony, judged by those in or subject to the system.
(a) The Insufficiency of Legal Rules
What would explain, and shape, this complementarity? Like others
with a sophisticated view of the law, Beverley McLachlin recognized as
“myth that if the judge looks hard enough and long enough and wisely
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enough, the judge will find in the law the single clear answer to the
question before her”.42 Elaborate as a set of legal rules may be, it does
not always provide complete answers to legal problems. And when those
legal problems yield disputes, “there must be an institution to resolve
what the law requires … That institution, quite simply, is the courts”.43
The insufficiency of the set of rules is manifold.
(i) Imprecision
It includes the inevitable imprecision of the rules’ expression. As the
Chief Justice put it, “legal rules can be no more precise or absolute than
the words of which they consist … The meanings of words vary from
person to person and from context to context”.44 The judge is therefore
called to decide rules’ meaning through the process of interpretation.
(ii) Incompleteness
Insufficiency also results from the incompleteness of the rules. That
is, sometimes legal problems present themselves that no rule of the
system responds to. This could be because of a legal oversight, or
because the problem is novel and was therefore unanticipated when the
rules were made. One way of interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Carter on assisted-dying is that its prior decision in Rodriguez had
already become a dead letter, due to its reliance on a context that had
since changed, such that the trial court was not defying a Supreme Court
precedent, but providing an answer where the law was incomplete as a
result of a prior answer having, by its own terms, been rendered
obsolete.45 Where the rules, for whatever reason, are incomplete, the
judge is tasked with filling “gaps” in the law.

42
Beverley McLachlin, “Judging in a Democratic State”, Remarks, online:
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Democratic State”].
43
Id.
44
Beverley McLachlin, “Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada” (1992) 56
Sask. L. Rev. 167, at 171 [hereinafter “Rules & Discretion”].
45
See e.g., Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331,
2015 SCC 5, at para. 44 (S.C.C.).
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(iii) Indeterminacy
Where multiple rules conflict, and it is unclear which of them governs
a particular problem, the indeterminacy of that answer results in a further
insufficiency in the system of rules. As the Chief Justice explains:
[W]hich of two conflicting rules should be applied? ... Scholars call this
the problem of indeterminacy in the law … Instead of being presented
with one single certain answer, judges must choose between different
answers, each of which may be argued to be “correct”.46

(iv) Fixity
The inherently dynamic character of the law discloses another
insufficiency in the rules as they exist at any particular point in time.
Legal rules are created in pursuit of particular objectives (and in Canada,
which as noted has endorsed Driedger’s approach, are indeed purposive).
Accordingly, a fixed rule is one whose fixity, at some level, reflects its
embeddedness in context. When confronted with a new context, judges
must determine whether the existing rule applies “as is”, or whether it
can and should be refined (or whether the law is actually incomplete and
a new rule is needed). As Chief Justice McLachlin says:
It is impossible in writing the law or pronouncing a judgment to
envision all the situations which may arise in the future. When a new
and unforeseen situation arises, it brings with it questions. Does a
particular legal rule apply to the new situation? … Or, if a certain rule
appears to apply, does it need to be modified to do justice in the new
situation?47

(v) Abstraction
Additional insufficiency of the rules emerges from the law’s need for
application. The law is not self-applying. As the Chief Justice states, “our
job as judges … is to settle questions about … how it should be
applied”.48 The law could not rely on “a robot for a judge”,49 she adds,
because application is not merely a matter of logic and evidence, but also
of fitting abstract rules to the real world, and of practical sense, and
46
47
48
49

Democratic State, supra, note 42.
Id.
On SCC, supra, note 23.
Democratic State, supra, note 42.
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judgment.50 The issue here is not greater precision in the terms of rules in
the abstract, discussed earlier, but translation of those terms into the reallife terms that cases involve. Identifying the proper correspondence is not
a matter of computation: it is not a mathematical translation that is
required, but a human translation from conceptual meaning to concrete
experience.
These needs are particularly acute in the case of rules that provide
only broad guidance while relying on judicial discretion to take account
of case-specific circumstances unknown or unappreciable by a
legislature. In McLachlin C.J.C.’s words, “judges faced with this sort of
language must shape and carve and sometimes limit it, like a sculptor
shapes a stone, finding the ultimate shape within the undefined block”.51
(vi) Unjustification
Lastly, the law’s need for legitimation admits a further insufficiency.
Here, I do not mean merely a theoretical construct of its legitimation as
emanating from sources authorized by and according to conditions
prescribed by the legal order itself, whose legitimacy critics have also
questioned.52 The Chief Justice is concerned with “the problem of
legitimacy”53 in real terms — that is, as a matter of the perception of
present stakeholders, and above all “public confidence in the legal
process. Only when it is absent does one realize how vital it is to the rule
of law and how difficult it is to achieve”.54 Without it, people “will not
settle their disputes through the courts. They will not obey court orders.
Judgments become” mere words or “clanging bells, full of sound and
fury, but signifying nothing”.55 Sustaining legitimacy means that,
regardless of the rule, “justice must also be delivered in a responsive
manner, one that takes account of the social context” through judicial
decision-making processes and justification.56
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NZ, supra, note 11, at 3.
Rules & Discretion, supra, note 44, at 171.
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See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, “Déclarations d’Indépendance” in Otobiographies:
l’enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre (Paris: Galilée, 1984), at 13-32, arguing
that legal orders are born of legal rupture, and hence ultimately rest on illegitimate foundations.
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Democratic State, supra, note 42.
54
Beverley McLachlin, “Judicial Independence”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/>.
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Beverley McLachlin, “The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media”, Remarks,
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/>.
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(vii) The Law’s Needs Beyond the Law’s Rules
Together, then, these facets of the rules — their imprecision,
incompleteness, indeterminacy, dynamic character, and need for
application and legitimation — reveal the rules’ insufficiency. And the
judge must make up for this in each case through, respectively:
interpretation; filling gaps; resolving conflicts among rules; developing
the law; applying the law; and employing decision-making processes and
justifications that strengthen rather than weaken the law’s “living”
legitimacy. How might a judge tackle this task?
(b) The “Modern” Approach to Dealing with the Rules’ Insufficiency?
Chief Justice McLachlin observes that: “The role of judges is simply
stated. Describing how judges actually go about discharging their duties,
however, is more difficult. Over the years, myths have grown up — myths
that obscure the true nature and challenge of judging”.57 Chief among
these is “the myth of the declaratory theory” — just addressed: that the set
of legal rules within a legal system is sufficient to answer all the legal
problems generated by the society it governs. And the opposite myth is that
the law is nothing more than judges’ “idiosyncratic application of personal
preferences”.58 This would not be law at all, but arbitrary rule. As the Chief
Justice spells out:
It is not for judges to … impose their personal views on society. The
role of judges is to support the rule of law, not the rule of judicial
whim. Judges are human beings; but they must strive to judge
impartially after considering the facts, the law and the submissions of
parties on all sides of the question.59

Equally inappropriate is to pour political ideology into the space left
by legal rules’ insufficiency. Chief Justice McLachlin declares that this
“result-oriented, agenda-driven judging. I am the first to say that … this
kind of judging would be bad”;60 it “breeds cynicism, and undermines
public confidence in all of our institutions”.61 This is because “legislation
57

Democratic State, supra, note 42.
Macfarlane, supra, note 2, at 58.
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Beverley McLachlin, “Respecting Democratic Roles”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scccsc.ca/> [hereinafter “Democratic Roles”].
60
Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Legislatures, and Executives in the Post-Charter Era”
(1999) 20:3 Policy Options 43 [hereinafter “Courts Legislatures Executives”].
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Democratic Roles, supra, note 59.
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is often the product of compromise or conflict between various political
factions, each faction pushing its own agenda. The judicial arena does
not, and should not, provide simply another forum for the same kind of
contests”.62 Such ideological “judicial activism” is self-defeating in the
long run anyway: there is a native elasticity in the law, but pulled on too
hard from one end, Newton’s Third Law reminds us that every action
produces an equal and opposite reaction.63 In the meantime, harm is done
to the Rule of Law, and all that rides on it.
Chief Justice McLachlin concludes that “the true nature of judging
seems to me to lie somewhere between” either assuming the rules are
complete or else trivializing their existence by parachuting in readymade answers belonging to other normative systems.64 It is therefore a
matter of trying to extrapolate from the partial-answers to be found
within the existing set of rules what would provide the best answer to the
new problem at hand: “Judges have no choice but to give the answer that
in the end, after deep reflection and consideration of all relevant facts
and rules, they conclude is best”.65 This can be done in different ways,
whether regularized or ad hoc. Each way embraces a complementarity
between the rules and the approach used to transcend their insufficiency.
Harmony is one such way, for what it will suggest is only intelligible
by reference to the elements, relationships among elements, and
relationships between elements and the whole, that it consists in. As
applied to legal problem-solving, those elements include the various
rules and their insufficiencies to be found in the legal system, as well as
relevant and legally recognized aspects of the subject and context of the
problem to which they are being applied. Harmony is therefore among
the approaches faithful to the system. But as between it and other
approaches sharing that fidelity to the law as a system, harmony, with its
pervasive association with the just order, is best-suited to guide such a
process not simply to some answer to the legal problem, but to one that
achieves the end of a just order. By no means can it ensure such a result,
either in a particular case or across a court’s docket, for all the usual
reasons why adjudication is an imperfect science. But at least it is a
conception oriented towards that aspiration, incorporating holistic and
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individual elements and their complex interrelationship. As the Chief
Justice states, “in performing this function [of seeking answers], judges
inevitably are expected to perform a second function, namely, to ensure
that the law develops in a way that is good for society and the men,
women and children who are its members”.66 In short, “a good decision
is one that is just, according to law”.67 Harmony ideally complements the
corpus of legal rules, with which it shares the same ultimate end: “A civil
society is an ordered society; but it is more: it is also a society concerned
to ensure the conditions for collective and individual human
flourishing”.68
Thus, much as the modern approach to interpretation seeks harmony
among text, context, scheme, and purposes, the “modern” approach to
the broader judicial task responds to any brand of insufficiency apt to be
resolved in that forum by seeking the answer which understands the
problem in context, and in relation to it, best attains harmony among the
relevant legal criteria and their purposes, including the legal system’s
ultimate intention of promoting order and justice in society: “a just
society and the rule of law”.69 This is the style characteristic of the work
of Chief Justice McLachlin.

II. HARMONY AS AN AIM AND AS A PROCESS OF RESOLVING
LEGAL PROBLEMS
At this juncture, it may be useful to drill down further on what
harmony means in this context as an overall aim of legal problemsolving, and what process is entailed in pursuing it. If it might be the case
that this offers a worthwhile way of addressing the challenge of resolving
legal problems, or even just a serviceable conceptual vehicle for thinking
about that task, it must be explained such that it is neither nebulous nor
left to the discrete imagination of each reader.

66
Beverley McLachlin, “The Supreme Court and the Public Interest” (2001) 64 Sask. L.
Rev. 309, at 311 [hereinafter “Public Interest”].
67
Beverley McLachlin, “Respecting Democratic Roles”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scccsc.ca/>.
68
NZ, supra, note 11, at 29.
69
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Lawyers’ Association”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Martin Medal”].
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1. Harmony as an Aim of Legal Problem-Solving
(a) The Harmonious Resolution of Legal Issues
In using the term “harmony” to describe a distinctive feature of what
Chief Justice McLachlin’s resolutions of legal issues aspire to achieve,
what is contemplated? It refers to an approach attuned to how a
legal problem involves an ensemble of certain interrelated legal
considerations, and which strives to resolve the problem through a
certain composition of those considerations. The composition sought is
one noteworthy for ensuring that the issue is heard as part of the way the
composition orchestrates the collective expression of the ensemble.
Breaking this down further, a number of characteristics can be
identified in the resolution of a legal issue which is successful in
achieving harmony.
Preliminarily, one discerns that it is attained by a response
preoccupied not with decision-making but with problem-solving. Chief
Justice McLachlin describes a similar outlook on the part of Chief Justice
Dickson: “whether we call it imagination, whether we call it flexibility”,
what stood out was “the way he approached problems”; and she adds,
“I learned an enormous amount from him about judging”.70 Elsewhere, in
describing the judicial task, she refers to the “challenge of governance”,71
and to “finding solutions”.72 This focus on problem-solving rather than
decision-making is important because it frames the nature of the exercise
that will follow.
A key characteristic of a resolution that achieves harmony is
consciousness that no legal problem is a singular matter; each consists in
a unique ensemble of multiple interrelated legal considerations. By this,
I mean elements the law ought to take into account, whether because
they are (already) recognized as or by legal authority, or because the
social purposes served by the law so demand. In fact, these may not be
strictly separable: as Chief Justice McLachlin highlights, “the idea that
there’s some law out there that has nothing to do with consequences and
how it plays out in the real world is an abstract and inaccurate
representation of what the law is”.73 Legitimate considerations could be
70
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substantive, procedural, institutional, remedial, relational, or of some
other level, depending on the issue. The qualifier “legitimate” is to
exclude factors that are improper, irrelevant to the immediate issue, etc.
However, the problem and its potential solution are not isolated, but
dwell within a broader system, so that other background considerations
(such as human dignity, or the Rule of Law) may be pertinent, or in the
case of the system’s ultimate object of a just order, an overarching
interest that guides the composition of the others.
This composition of the considerations is another basic characteristic
of a harmonious resolution of a legal problem. It requires figuring how
these various constituents should be fit together, in the context given, to
respond to the issue in the way that best gives effect to the ensemble of
factors from the standpoint of the overall system intent of a just order of
them as a collective. In turn, this relies on a belief that it is possible and
preferable for legal solutions to give expression to multiple interests; that
is, in the words of the Chief Justice, “It follows from what I have said
that we cannot view the problem in terms of ‘either-or’,” among values
at stake.74 However, the various values’ expression cannot be simply
aggregated either, for they are incommensurable; it must be orchestrated,
and attend to how they can together produce harmony. Isolated interests
together constitute a whole, while the whole is composed of various
isolable interests. Within the whole, each value has its proper place, plays
a particular role, and dwells in due proportion. To put it in social terms,
“the goal”, the Chief Justice explains, “is decisions that best represent the
interests of the community as a whole”,75 bearing in mind “the fact,
proven through the millennia, that human beings can realize themselves
only as part of a larger group”.76 Given the factors’ incommensurability,
justice can only be achieved by skilfully ascertaining and achieving their
composition in a way that reflects their particular positions and
distinctive roles in the ensemble, a feature impossible to explain more
precisely but universally than through the notion of harmony.
Used to describe this endeavour, the aspiration to achieve harmony in
resolving legal problems makes for an approach to judicial decisionmaking that is complex and often difficult. Chief Justice McLachlin
explains:
74
Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?”,
Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Unwritten Constitution”].
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The first difficulty is the intellectual and moral effort of struggling to
find the best answer. The judge must not only evaluate the legal options
but understand the implications of doing so. These may be complex and
polycentric. Changing one rule may impact in myriad ways on other
rules and legal values. Legal philosopher Lon Fuller likened the judge’s
task to pulling on one strand of a spider’s web; in doing so she changes
not only the strand on which she is pulling, but rearranges all the other
strands as well. It is thus not surprising that judges may agonize long
and hard in arriving at their ultimate conclusions on the law.77

The greater the number of considerations involved (e.g., existing legal
authorities, social realities to be governed), and the more intricate their
interrelationship, the more challenging that task becomes.
In an extended passage from a public lecture offering precious
insight into the big picture of this task, Chief Justice McLachlin tells a
story from the Protagoras, “one of the greatest Socratic dialogues”, in
which Plato asks Socrates “the basic conditions of human society”.78
His answer, she relates in modern terms, is “two qualities — legal order
and a shared sense of belonging, restraint and responsibility”.79 When
disputes arise, it falls to judges to ensure these qualities’ fulfilment. She
goes on to explain that through “the deliberative function”, judges
“work out the myriad accommodations that make up the fabric of civil
society … Conflicting interests are addressed, compromises worked
out. The result is the body of rules by which we maintain social
order”.80 Thus, “to sum up, the law makes the project of human beings
living together possible by providing social order through governance,
and a deliberative process by which groups and individuals work out
their disputes and make the accommodations that allow peaceful coexistence”.81 Most vitally, she states that: “If, like Zeus in Socrates
metaphor, our goal is to find a way in which people can live together in
peace, harmony and productivity, we will seek not only the law, but law
whose content will promote those goals”.82 The story is told from the
perspective of people, whom the legal system exists to serve; but for
their living experience to be that of a just order … a just order must
first be composed in the mind of the judge, orchestrating the
77
78
79
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considerations involved as directly or indirectly affecting people,
drawing on a mix of methods such as she describes.
Hence, to achieve harmony in resolving a legal problem is to respect
all relevant legitimate considerations, and to identify the legal response
which, in addressing the problem, best gives collective expression to
these elements as part of an integral system of just order.
(b) Incongruous Uses of “Harmony” as a Legal Term
In order to avoid any confusion about the meaning of harmony in the
context described here, it may help to dispel ambiguity by noting some
other law-related uses of the term that are not what the term refers to in
this article. All are faithful to “harmony” as a notion, but employ it in
different spheres, focusing on harmony within a specific subject-class.
These other usages may be encompassed by the one here, but are
underinclusive of it, and on their own would distort a reader’s
appreciation of what the term refers to in this article’s discussion.
Examining the interrelationship of the various uses may help bring
into sharper relief the usage of the term made here, described in
Section II.1(a).
(i) Social Harmony
The term “harmony” is sometimes used as a short-form for “social
harmony”. What harmony refers to in this article may, in some cases,
include social harmony as one of the legitimate interests. This would be
the case, for instance, in Family Law where spousal harmony is linked to
the best interests of children.83 It would likewise be so in Labour Law,
where harmonious labour relations have been recognized as a regulatory
objective.84 It may well be a background consideration in most cases: the
Chief Justice speaks of “the creation of a harmonious society where
every individual feels not only accepted but truly welcome”.85 However,
what harmony refers to in this article is far from limited to social
harmony constituting, in some cases, one factor in resolving disputes.
Moreover, social harmony may conflict with the type of harmony
83

See note 37 and associated text.
See note 38 and associated text.
85
Beverley McLachlin, “The Impact of the Supreme Court of Canada on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/>.
84

26

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d)

described in this article where social harmony is used, in socio-legal
contexts, to refer to a norm antithetical to litigation and/or impartial
systems of dispute-resolution based on the application of legal
principle.86
(ii) Harmony as Uniformity
The term “harmony” may also be employed to describe different laws
or standards’ concordance. The process of “approximation or
coordination” which brings laws into some uniformity is sometimes
referred to as “harmonization”.87 This is the case, for instance, in EU Law,
where questions often arise of “maximum” (full) versus “minimum”
(partial) harmonization.88 This use of the term may be encompassed by
the harmony that is the subject of this article in scenarios where striving
for uniformity is an appropriate way of composing items. For instance,
on the legislative front, Canada has a set of “harmonization” statutes,
serving the need to co-ordinate federal law with Quebec civil law.89
However, the harmony that is the subject of this article may be achieved
by other means, and often must be, since pursuing uniformity is not
appropriate where, for instance, the relevant elements reflect disparate
considerations.
(iii) Harmony as Coherence
The word “harmony” is also sometimes used in the sense of
coherence, internal consistency, or avoidance of repugnancy within the
provisions or operational logic of a body of law. Interpretation’s “Golden
Rule” is a far-reaching example.90 The judgment of McLachlin J. (as she
then was) in Hall v. Hebert, that the Tort doctrine of illegality was
86
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concerned with the integrity of the justice system in the sense of
“coherence … the need to prevent internal inconsistency in the law” is
another example, famous throughout the common law.91 Harmony in the
sense of coherence may often be part of what is required to achieve the
broader meaning of harmony detailed in this article. After all, a just order
must be ordered. But, a just order requires much more than coherence.
And internal consistency is of little use in some situations, such as in
dealing with expressly opposing considerations.
2. Harmony as a Process of Legal Problem-Solving
Having set out what harmony comprises as an overall aspiration in
legal problem-solving, and having distinguished that from other lawrelated uses of the term, the question arises: how can it be achieved? If it
might provide a profitable way of conceiving of an aim of legal disputeresolution, the ability of those interested to put it into practice imposes a
need for an account of the process for pursuing it. Because harmony is a
quality of relationships between elements which differ from case to case,
and because the task it guides is a human task,92 the process of pursuing
harmony can only be described in broad terms, and beyond that
necessarily relies on the judge’s experience, skills, instincts, and
judgment combined with the particularities of each case.
With that in mind, Chief Justice McLachlin sketched an overall
picture of the process for pursuing the harmonious resolution of a legal
problem in expressing that:
The judge … She must struggle to enunciate the values at issue. Then
she must attempt to strike the balance between the conflicting values
which most closely conforms to justice as society, taken as a whole,
sees it … to make decisions which are in the broader interests of
society.93

I now break down this process into its principal steps, and elaborate
some of the facets each may involve.
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(a) Identifying the Considerations at Stake
As the Chief Justice’s quote suggests, the first step in striving to
achieve a harmonious resolution of a legal problem is to identify the
considerations legitimately implicated by the problem: “Before they
decide a difficult issue”, she explains, judges “should carefully consider
and articulate the competing considerations”.94 The task is one of
“‘recognition’ of the interests”95 in order to “ensure that all aspects of the
problem are considered”,96 with attention to how some “values may be at
risk of being overlooked or overridden”.97
How might judges do this? There is no mechanistic procedure; but
certain human postures are vital. The Chief Justice cites above all a
distinct brand of impartiality, which I would describe as an “active
omnipartiality”.98 Rather than just passively and impassively hearing the
opposing parties, which is sufficient strictly to deciding partisan dispute,
active omnipartiality is concerned with the legal problem underlying that
dispute, and consists of actively “considering the problem from all
sides”.99 More precisely, “the judge must seek to see and appreciate the
point of view of each of the protagonists”,100 perceived through the selfconscious lens of each of their “cultural commitments and assumptions,
their particular voice and perspective”.101 In this way, the judge “takes
into account (although not necessarily accepting) the parties’ conflicting
94

Multicultural, supra, note 15, at para. 32.
Religion, supra, note 14, at 27.
96
NZ, supra, note 11, at 5.
97
Multicultural, supra, note 15, at para. 8.
98
Chief Justice McLachlin has used a different phrase for this — “conscious objectivity”:
see e.g., NZ, supra, note 11, at 6. However, what it refers to is much more complex, and perhaps
different than what a literal or injudicious reading of that phrase may suggest. Partly, this stems from
the fact that “objectivity” in law is still subjectivity, but non-particular (e.g., not the particular
defendant, but a reasonable person, in the objective test of intention in Contracts or objective
standard of fault in Criminal Law). In one sense, the process the Chief Justice describes is
hypersubjective, in that it encourages active engagement with subjective perspectives, and not just
one, but all that are relevant: see also her extensive discussion (joint with L’Heureux-Dubé J.) in
R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] S.C.J. No. 84, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RDS”] in the context
of racial profiling and official bias, where she explains how subjectivity is not only unavoidable but
valuable. It is from the affirmative action that incorporates all subjective perspectives, besides the
judge’s own, combined with use of a self-conscious lens in each instance, that impartiality or legal
“objectivity” results. If this conscious objectivity (or active omnipartiality) is part of the proper
adjudicative procedure, harmony might then be understood as its substantive counterpart in what it
aims to help achieve.
99
Dickson, supra, note 18, at 88.
100
Role of Judges, supra, note 20.
101
Training Judiciary, supra, note 23.
95

(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d)

JUSTICE AS HARMONY

29

views on the facts, the law, and the interplay between them”.102 Beyond
parties and perspectives, “the judge approaches the legal principles
bearing on the question with the same” method.103 “This practice enables
the judge to see all the ramifications of complex conflicts and arrive at
accurate and fair characterizations of the issues”.104
Achieving this active omnipartiality, in turn, requires openness. As the
Chief Justice expounds, the “judge’s mind must be open and receptive to
ideas and arguments”, because a “willingness to receive and act upon
new and different ideas, arguments, and views lies at the heart” of the
task.105 She clarifies that impartiality, in the sense of this active
omnipartiality, “does not, like neutrality, require judges to rise above all
values and perspectives. Rather, it requires judges to try, as far as they
can, to open themselves to all perspectives … fairly taking into account
all of the perspectives engaged”.106
Besides openness, active omnipartiality seems to encompass a
meditative aspect — “thoughtful reflection” — as she describes.107
Identifying the legal interests invoked by a problem also depends on
familiar modes of legal reasoning. Chief Justice McLachlin specifies that
“deductive reasoning helps judges decide how to apply a general rule in a
particular case. Inductive reasoning may assist judges in identifying the
appropriate general rule. Often [they] are used together”.108
Besides reasoning skills, identifying the values legitimately at stake in
a legal problem requires a quality of attunement. As the Chief Justice
declares:
It no longer suffices to be a competent legal scholar and a fair arbiter.
To perform their modern role well, judges must be sensitive to a broad
range of social concerns. They must possess a keen appreciation of the
importance of individual and group interests and rights. And they must
be in touch with the society in which they work, understanding its
values and its tensions.109
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This ability is not strictly innate; Chief Justice McLachlin highlights
how attunement to social context “now constitute[s] an important part of
judicial education in many countries”.110
On that note, the interests to be identified must themselves be
understood and articulated in contextual, not abstract, terms. The Chief
Justice describes this “technique” as one “which requires judges to
examine issues in their full social context and with awareness to how
they impact on people’s lives”.111 For example, in identifying the speech
interest to be weighed against the legislative object in Canada (Attorney
General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp.,112 McLachlin C.J.C. does not cast it in
abstraction simply as “the right to freedom of expression”, but considers
the context, in which the expression consists more particularly of tobacco
advertising, so that “the expression at stake is of low value”.113
In general, identifying the factors requires care as to their definition
and delimitation. A distorted rendering of a consideration could shortcircuit the entire adjudicative analysis, leading to an unjust result; thus
the judge “must learn to recognize her own biases, and struggle to keep
them out”.114 Likewise, an insufficiently precise definition could lead to
perceived conflict between multiple legitimate interests, which instead
“should be resolved through the proper delineation of the rights and
values involved”.115 The scope and bounds of each legal interest must be
ascertained: “Past cases and hypothetical situations are analysed
inductively to test how far a certain norm extends, or ought to extend”.116
Factors that are prima facie identified as relevant must also be filtered
to remove those in some way illegitimate in resolving the legal problem
at hand. That is, they must be screened to keep out those which would,
for some reason, be inappropriate to take into account. One example
would be facts known to the judge but which are not in evidence, nor a
proper subject for judicial notice. Public opinion polls on a matter sub
judice would, in most cases, constitute another example.
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(b) Piecing Together the Considerations
As alluded to in the initial sketch by Chief Justice McLachlin of what
depicts the overall process of striving to achieve a harmonious resolution
of a legal problem, the second principal step is to bring together the
various considerations involved, and respond to the issue posed in a way
that gives collective expression to those elements and represents a just
order as a whole.
Finding the best collective expression that can be given to the values
requires study of their interrelationship within the problem: Do they
share common ground? Do they conflict? Are they reconcilable?
Depending on the nature of their interrelationship, distinct methods are
needed in order to compose them into a harmonious whole. Several such
methods of composition exist, each suited to differing scenarios.
Examples of these methods may include consensus, proximity,
reconciliation, accommodation, balancing, and compromise. Resolving
the overall legal problem entails, in most cases, the use of multiple
methods, each dealing with separate aspects or steps of the composition
as a whole.
In order to most clearly explain and illustrate the operation of these
various methods, it is convenient to examine them one at a time.
(i) Methods of Composition
(A) CONSENSUS
One key method of composing elements is by consensus. Consensus
here means finding common ground among multiple legal positions.
Consensus needn’t be complete, encompassing comprehensive accord.
Partial consensus, comprising agreement within an area of overlap, can
still be fruitful, and is more often possible. A prominent example
leveraging the method of consensus is as applied to the views on a case
of the justices of the McLachlin Supreme Court. It being a collegiate
court, those views constitute nine institutionally legitimate considerations
bearing on its resultant caselaw. For this and related reasons, when
Beverley McLachlin became Chief Justice, she identified consensus on
the bench as a top priority.117 She reinforced that “consensus doesn’t
117
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mean we’re all going to agree on everything … But consensus is
valuable, in the sense that our goal is to try to reduce to a minimum the
number of things we differ on”.118 The success of her efforts is confirmed
by her successor, Richard Wagner, who remarked at his inauguration as
Chief Justice that “she moved us to see what united us rather than what
divided us. The Court, and our law, are the better for it”.119 Another
example, this one dealing with consensus among multiple legal doctrines
not judicial views, was Lord Denning’s famed but ill-fated claim that
duress, undue influence, and unconscionability in Contract were
instances of an underlying principle of “inequality of bargaining power” —
a view refuted by the House of Lords.120
(B) PROXIMITY
A related means of combining factors is through finding a proximity
between them, referring here to: identifying a close relationship or a
meaningful similarity between them. In some cases, this may involve
refining and recasting considerations so as to render more apparent the
ways in which they are proximate, thereby correspondingly deemphasizing their divergences. In other cases, it may involve seeking a
nexus between them, that illuminates an important link or connection
they share that, in turn, supports the conclusion that they dwell in a
certain proximity. Proximity, like consensus, reduces conflict between
considerations. Yet, it is distinct from consensus in that it does not find
common ground but finds perhaps neighbouring land or similar ground.
Hence, where full consensus is unattainable or undesirable, proximity
may serve to shrink disparity between considerations by loosening the
degree of coterminacy or conformity sought between them, rather than
by lessening the extent of accord sought between them as partial
consensus does. One example is whether there is a relationship between a
plaintiff and defendant that would suggest that they were in proximity,
justifying a duty of care under the tort of negligence.121 Another example,
aimed at criminal punishments pursuing proximity in the form of
118
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similarity, is the principle of “parity in sentencing” (harmonisation des
peines), which provides that “a sentence should be similar to sentences
imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar
circumstances”.122
(C) RECONCILIATION
Another way to assemble facets is through reconciliation. As used
here, reconciliation consists in seeking an interpretation of different legal
considerations that avoids repugnancy between them, so that expression
can be given to each. One important example, which reconciles multiple
legal provisions, is the Golden Rule of interpretation, mentioned
earlier.123 Another prominent application is to the reconciliation of the
rights of Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.124 As a method, it presents
difficulties; as the Chief Justice notes, “reconciliation requires openness
of spirit, endurance and great patience. But I believe that it is worth the
effort” in what it enables.125
(D) ACCOMMODATION
Composition of interests can also be accomplished through
accommodation. By this term, I mean: realizing the collective expression
of multiple values by giving effect to only certain aspects of each,
mutually tailored so as to avoid clashes between them. Accommodation
is related to reconciliation in that both seek to avert the “exclusion” of
legitimate considerations.126 Whereas reconciliation tries to understand
each of the factors in a way that prevents conflict in the first place,
accommodation initially accepts the existence of conflict but then strives
to eliminate it by adapting each consideration to a reality in which they must
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coexist without either’s entire individual expression. The Chief Justice
describes accommodation as a “delicate task”127 that involves “working out”
or “brokering” differences.128 Accommodation plays a central role in
Disability Law, giving effect to equality for disabled persons.129 Another
notable example of its use is in Aboriginal Law, where the Crown may have
a duty to adapt affected policies to accommodate Aboriginal interests.130
(E) COMPROMISE
Another mode of orchestrating diverse elements is through compromise.
Faced with unavoidably competing interests, compromise operates to
negotiate a give-and-take among them that gives partial effect to each, but
also denies partial effect to each. Though related to balancing, compromise
as here employed is distinct in applying where a conflict-dynamic arises out
of the circumstances, rather than being inherent to the relationship between
the considerations. Further, compromise is not a weighing of considerations,
but a balance of expectations, factoring in expediency, other pragmatic
matters, and circumstantial contingencies. Compromise is central to the “Cooperative” conception of Canadian federalism favoured by the McLachlin
Court.131 Another use was achieving restraint in the issuance of concurring
opinions in the McLachlin Court, which colleagues of McLachlin C.J.C. cite
as resulting from her encouraging justices to “‘compromise’ or
‘accommodate’ the views of others”, where appropriate.132 These examples
point to how compromise may often be used in tandem with
accommodation, as part of the set of methods required to resolve a legal
issue. As the Chief Justice put it, “solutions to our problems” require
“constant compromise and negotiation between conflicting ideas
and groups”.133
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(F) BALANCING
Balancing, discussed earlier, is likewise a technique commonly used
to deal with divergent values present within a legal problem. Like
compromise, balancing serves to resolve unavoidable conflicts. It
endeavours, through a relative weighing of the considerations, to balance
them in some way. Two scenarios can be discerned. The first is where the
conflict arises from a natural opposition between the considerations, so
that giving more effect to one entails giving less to another. An example
might be the regulatory interests of legal certainty versus flexibility. As
the Chief Justice observes, “lawyers facing oppositions such as these use
the metaphor of balancing … we add or take away until we reach the
proper balance”.134 In this scenario, then, the aim is to find a balance
point that gives partial effect to each (or by another legal metaphor,
determining “where to draw the line”).
In the second balancing scenario, the conflict arises, as in compromise,
from the circumstances — however, those circumstances also include the
conflict’s uptake into a legally prescribed balancing test. Such a test might
be necessary where, because of some factual or legal imperative, neither
the first balancing scenario nor compromise are possible or practical. One
value must then be given effect at the expense of the other. In order
to decide which one, the test weighs their relative importance to a
just result. The weighing is context-specific, not in abstracto, so that
different interests may prevail in different contexts. This, Chief Justice
McLachlin reports, helps achieve the “balances necessary for a workable
[body of] law acceptable to society as a whole”.135 A prime example
of balancing of this kind is the proportionality test for limiting
Charter rights.136
(ii) The Logic in Choosing a Method
The preceding discussion should render evident the fact that there is
a logic to the different methods, which informs how they work and the
scenarios they are suited to. Recourse to them at random will not
134
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produce harmony (other than coincidentally). Rather, the harmonious
resolution of legal problems envisages that each of these methods is
necessary at certain times and in certain contexts. And thus, harmony as
a process is knowing (whether by intuition, or more formalized
reasoning, or some combination of these) which method to use in what
scenario.
Related to this point, and as an example of it, the order in which the
different methods were presented above lay on a spectrum from no conflict
between considerations (consensus) to unmediated conflict (the second
form of balancing). One would expect that, generally speaking, modes of
composition which better avoid clashes, where possible, will enable the
fullest collective expression, yielding a more harmonious resolution. For
example, in constitutional review, the Chief Justice proposes that:
First, it seems to me, the judge must seek to interpret a suspect law in a
way that reconciles it with the constitutional norm, written or unwritten.
Usually, this will resolve the problem. But in rare cases, it may not. If an
ordinary law is clearly in conflict with a fundamental constitutional
norm, the judge may have no option but to refuse to apply it.137

Notable in that regard: the concept I previously thought definitive —
balance — is in fact the crudest way of pursuing the harmony that
characterizes Chief Justice McLachlin’s resolution of legal problems.
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that balancing is often necessary
due to the structure of litigation, the form of many legal tests, and the
myriad conflicts typical of life and law in modern society.
(iii) Mixed Methods in Complex Problems
Above all, what the complexity of contemporary legal problems signals
is that in any given case, the process of composing considerations is likely
to involve a mix of multiple methods, each targeted to deal with different
parts of the polyphony of elements seeking expression. This includes parts
dwelling at distinct levels: substantive, procedural, institutional, remedial,
relational, etc. As Section II.2(b)(ii) may imply, harmony as a process is
also knowing, in the specific circumstances of a given problem, which
methods to use in what sequence in dealing with different parts of the
137
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overall problem. A more extensive elaboration of patterns of use of
different methods, alone and in mixes, may offer a fruitful topic for future
study. However, as mentioned, the process is not reducible to an algorithm,
for it requires a full array of judicial skills and human qualities of
judgment and common sense.
(c) Justification of How the Process Has Been Conducted
A final aspect of the process of pursuing a harmonious resolution of a
legal problem is justifying the conduct of that process. This is not a separate
step, but woven into the prior steps of identifying and combining
considerations, where it addresses the aforestated need for legitimation. In
the initial step, it does so by calling for legitimate factors’ frank
acknowledgment, even if they are not given effect in how the elements
must be put together at the subsequent step. In that latter step, it does so by
explaining why those legitimate interests could not be given effect in the
resolution rendered, including clarifying what was distinct about that
context versus others where they could find expression. Chief Justice
McLachlin underlines this need “to explain to those Canadians who feel
that their moral opinions have been left behind why they should nonetheless
celebrate and feel invested in the [legal] morality upon which their
communal co-existence is based”.138 As such, this justification is sometimes
said to have a “therapeutic” effect on society, by mitigating conflict and
fostering social harmony.139 By contrast, a style of justification that lapses
into the one-sidedness of advocacy, by only validating considerations
consistent with a judgment’s own resolution, is — regardless of the justness
of that outcome — a fundamental failure of justice at multiple levels.

III. THE COMPLEXITY OF JUSTICE: HARMONY AS COMPARED
TO OTHER APPROACHES TO LEGAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
1. Hearing More Voices Allows Pursuit of a Higher Order of
Justice
As noted in Section I.2.(b), seeking a resolution which achieves
harmony among the factors properly involved is not the only way of
138
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responding to a legal issue that is faithful to legal principles,
extrapolating from them, despite their own insufficiency. How does
harmony relate to some other regularized potential approaches?
Various possibilities can be distinguished based on how they address
the nature of the legal problem as involving multiple interrelated
legitimate interests.
(a) Singularity
From that perspective, a singular approach, which hears and gives
effect to only one consideration, while deaf to the others, presents
generally the lowest chance of attaining justice. It does not seek
expression of other legitimate interests, or account for them as part of the
whole. Even where one consideration is overriding, such a technique
fails to minimize collateral damage to the others, and thus to the whole of
which they are part. Special interest advocacy groups, not unsurprisingly,
often present problems this way, as if there is a single issue — free
speech, for instance. The risk of this is to drown out other voices; turning
legal problem-solving into a contest in which the loudest voice “wins”.
Yet justice fails by the neglect of others.
(b) Hierarchy
Alternatively, a hierarchical approach, which recognizes multiple
interests but relies on a categorical ranking of them, and so gives effect
to higher ranking interests over lower, is also generally inapt to achieve
justice. In practice, it does consciously what the singular approach does
unconsciously. This deep-seated modus operandi remains common
throughout the law, though out of favour in Canada under the McLachlin
Court — the Chief Justice repelled by the “Manichean logic of eitheror”, of all-or-nothing, of extremes and absolutes.140 Her reflection is that
“when we have made mistakes, it has been because we ... imposed blackand-white solutions on complex situations”.141
For the above two methodologies, the greatest concern is that, over
the totality of cases, they can cause systemic amplification of some
interests and silencing of others.
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(c) Balance
Used as a standalone approach, balancing (described earlier) is
perhaps the most prevalent and familiar. In the “line-drawing” type of
balancing, multiple interests can obtain partial expression in any given
case. In the “seesaw” type of balancing, one value is granted expression
at the expense of another. However, unlike the hierarchical approach, this
is not based on a categorical determination, but a case-by-case weighing,
factoring in context. Over the totality of cases, this allows different
considerations to gain expression, and on the whole for some account to
be taken of each. Hence, balancing is significantly better able to pursue
justice. Yet, on its own, it too sees the task as one of resolving conflict —
thus overlooking ways of diminishing conflict that could allow for
greater expression of appropriate considerations, and justice in the whole
that is composed of them. In this, balancing echoes the adversarialism of
the adjudicative process, where the sides demand opposing outcomes,
and the court must decide between them.142
The existence of the hierarchical and balancing techniques shows that,
as Chief Justice McLachlin concludes, “the problem is not in combining
[different] attributes in a single legal system, but in our thinking about
how we combine them. We need a new way of thinking about how we
combine them. We need a new way of looking at tension”.143
(d) Harmony
Compared with these other approaches, harmony represents a more
nuanced, versatile, and sophisticated framework for legal problemsolving. It strives to recognize as many different interests as are actually
at stake in a legal problem, rather than to reduce a complex reality to the
limited dimension(s) of preconceived legal devices designed primarily
for the simpler task of deciding disputes. “How can we better manage
difference?” asks the Chief Justice rhetorically: by a “response of
respect, inclusion, and accommodation”.144 On that last point, harmony
engages with the interrelationship between considerations as something
142
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dynamic — not only reflecting the context, but capable of adapting in
meaning or application to what a just resolution on the whole requires.
Harmony also perceives proximities, not just disparities. Yet, where
conflict among values cannot be avoided, or for other reasons should not,
harmony as noted encompasses tools of compromise and/or balance apt
to resolve such clashes. It has all the associated ways, suited to different
scenarios, of orchestrating the collective expression of different
elements, rather than limiting that expression because of passing every
such interrelationship through the thin filter of conflict.
Thus, among these various approaches to legal problem-solving that,
despite legal rules’ insufficiency, remain faithful to legal principles rather
than defecting to idiosyncrasy or ideology, the one which gives best
expression to those principles as an integral system which aspires to a
just order is harmony. It cannot promise results, but does provide to those
charged with pursuing it the right orientation, and equips them with
wide-ranging and deep-extending guidance.
2. Understanding Poor Adjudication as Disharmony
Again putting aside decisions that are bad because of being tainted by
idiosyncrasy or ideology, it follows from what has been said here that poor
adjudication can be understood as leaving a state of disharmony. While the
merit of particular resolutions of particular disputes will often be debated,
there are certain types of decisions that are widely seen as failures. If
pursuing harmony might be an optimal tack for legal problem-solving, it
should be possible to rethink why these decisions are bad by pegging how
they fall short in the pursuit of harmony. Some examples are outlined below.
(a) “Splitting the Baby”
One type of decision commonly seen as bad is “splitting the baby”, or
hedging. Viewed from the standpoint of striving for harmony as the way
to resolve legal problems, splitting the baby fails because it relies on
compromise where compromise is inappropriate. The parties could have
compromised, but came to court. Adjudication’s role in the system is
decision, and at that stage, the parties may be viewed as having more of a
stake in that process than in the substance of their dispute, given each
side’s inherent risk of losing. Striving for harmony requires respect for
the logic of the overall system and the distinct role of adjudication within
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it. This, and the associated aspect of the parties’ interests, are fundamental
institutional and procedural interests among the ensemble of considerations
legitimately at stake. From veterans of the Bar, one of the compliments
of Chief Justice McLachlin I have heard often is that “she never splits the
baby”.
(b) The Path of Least Resistance
Another type of bad decision is taking the path of “least resistance”,
or that is least opposed to popular expectations. Through the lens of
harmony as the way to resolve legal problems, this path can be seen to
lead astray, by misidentifying which factors are legitimately invoked by
the problem. I earlier quoted Chief Justice McLachlin on how judges
must be sensitive to society’s values.145 It is essential to appreciate that,
except where the following are proper evidence, this does not mean
majority public opinion, or the opinion of powerful segments of society
or of vocal groups, on moral questions that have become subjects of legal
dispute. Rather, it means deeper, more basic, and consensus values: what
she calls the “fundamental values upon which the society is premised —
the shared commitments and values that constitute the deeper community
constitutional morality”.146 Were it otherwise, “members of minority and
disadvantaged groups”, for instance, might not be protected, which the
Chief Justice has noted is important to the social harmony of “the larger
polity”, and consistent with courts’ role as the non-political branch
of government in the separation of powers — key institutional
considerations at stake in court decisions.147 She did not herself shrink
from conclusions sometimes unpopular, including, for instance, striking
down a government monopoly of health insurance,148 or even curbing the
scope of prohibited possession of child pornography.149
(c) Legal Error
The types of decisions reversed on appeal for errors of law, whether
by using the wrong legal test, or misinterpreting or misapplying it, are
145
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also explicable by the harmony framework for legal problem resolution.
The insufficiency of legal rules is not total; there are countless
reasonably settled principles — structures, rules about rules, doctrines,
etc. that define in part how different interests relate to one another in
various contexts, and prescribe how certain kinds of legal issues are to be
resolved. Harmony works complementarily with these settled parts of the
law, it does not displace them with unbridled discretion based on all of
the factors. Indeed, without the settled parts, there would be nothing to
guide the factors’ identification. Harmony does not exist in a vacuum. It
extrapolates from existing elements to perform its limited role of guiding
the problem-solving made necessary when the “right” answers are not
already clear. I quibble “right” because sometimes a court may conclude
that a clear precedent is wrong, and in appropriate cases, may develop
the law. In that case, the court in justifying the change by reference to the
considerations involved and the system’s aim of a just order, explains
why the new rule produces greater harmony than the old.
(d) Utopian Decisions
Given the law’s societal functions, decisions that are unduly
complicated or impracticable are also bad. From the perspective of
harmony as a guide to legal problem-solving, the failure in this case can be
crudely summarized as “quantity over quality” with respect to the
considerations. Harmony does not dictate giving effect, at all costs, to the
maximum number of values possible. Indeed, important regulatory
considerations associated with legality like clarity, intelligibility, and
consistency highlight the magnitude of practicability as a quality required
of a resolution that achieves harmony in real terms. Chief Justice
McLachlin has often commented on the need for practical sense;150 and
certainly it is a dimension of problem-solving in which she excelled.151
(e) Reductionist Decisions
The opposite type of decision, which reduces the complexity of a
problem to fit an oversimplified legal frame is also bad. Harmony, as a
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philosophy for resolving legal problems, would recognize this as the
result of short-changing the tasks of identifying and/or of composing the
various factors involved. Section III.1 (“Hearing More Voices Allows
Pursuit of a Higher Order of Justice”) cited approaches that provide
common examples of how this can happen.

IV. SOME DIMENSIONS OF APPLICATION OF HARMONY
IN RESOLVING LEGAL PROBLEMS
I now turn to surveying some of the types of considerations to which
may be applied this framework for legal problem-solving: of addressing
the issue at hand in such a way as to achieve harmony among the set of
legitimate considerations involved. This will serve two purposes. First,
the range of specific illustrations will serve to actively demonstrate the
breadth of the framework’s capacity of application. Second, as part of
that, the defined contexts in which its application will be surveyed may
help better concretize various aspects of its operation.
A full picture of the approach, encompassing its application to all the
dimensions that concurrently arise in any given legal problem, would
require something akin to an annotated “intellectual biography” of the
resolution of a case. This information being confidential, unless the
Supreme Court and the relevant members were willing to oblige, that
simply may not be possible.152 Nonetheless, recalling the co-existence in
a single problem of several of these “polycentric” dimensions of
potential application, the reader may be better equipped by the survey
which follows to imagine an approximation of a significant part of that
picture.153
Within the categories of considerations included below as illustrations
of the framework’s capacity of application, many examples can be found
in the career of Beverley McLachlin and the work of the McLachlin
Court. The succeeding sections offer glimpses of six different dimensions
of the challenges the Chief Justice faced, whether in adjudication, in
nurturing the legal system, in civic leadership, or combinations thereof.
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1. Sources
A dimension of many legal problems, which the harmony-seeking
approach to resolving legal problems can be applied to, is what to do
about an ensemble of disparate sources legitimately bearing on the
problem’s resolution.
Such an application is called for by the Law of Evidence in determining
the adjudicative facts of a case. The trial judge must decide which relevant
sources of evidence to exclude as in some sense illegitimate. Of the
evidence admitted, the trier of fact must then synthesize from among
portions that corroborate, complement, or contradict one another, in order
to form conclusions on the essential facts.
The scenario which this article started with as a potential archetype —
interpretation — determines the meaning of provisions also by drawing
harmoniously on different sources (text, context, scheme, intent). The
same is true of construction of statutory purpose.154 Even unwritten
constitutional principles, Chief Justice McLachlin recalls from the
Secession Reference155 having emerged by a similar exercise: “how can
unwritten constitution principles be identified? The answer is that they
can be identified from a nation’s past custom and usage; from the written
text, if any, of the nation’s fundamental principles; and from the nation’s
international commitments”,156 which again must be considered together,
harmoniously.
A significant function of appellate courts is to produce harmony at the
level of the system, from diverse sources. For example, from scattered
decisions of different courts at lower levels, they must organize a body of
law, credible to those inside and outside of the system as comprising a
just order. They must update the law as social realities change. To be
particularly appreciated, given the relatively few cases appellate courts
decide in comparison with the countless decisions made by lower courts,
administrative decision-makers, and even private lawyers advising
clients based on appellate courts’ guidance, is the effort Chief Justice
McLachlin devoted to maintaining the harmony achieved by an appellate
judgment beyond the instant of its release, by transmitting to front-line
legal decision-makers the means to preserve, and indeed further enhance,
that harmony. One way she did this was through what one encounters as
154
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also a mainstay of her renown among law students — what they often call
“multi-part tests” — which are only sometimes tests, but are always an
unmistakable rendering of the ratio decidendi, along with clear guidance
of how to apply it, and the highlighting of factors to be considered by
lower courts in adapting it and extending it to foreseeable future cases.
Bazley v. Curry,157 discussed in Sections IV.4-5 below, well illustrates this.
A final example of the approach’s application to sources is in striving
for harmony among the law’s institutional sources. This includes, by the
logic of the separation of powers, the legislature and the judiciary: while
legislation tends to be carved by the political winds prevailing at any
given time, jurisprudence can “support long-term values that may be
compromised or difficult to support given the need of elected members to
secure re-election and popular approval”.158 Our system of governance
through law is therefore “a complex, polycentric enterprise”,159 and for it
“to function well, each branch of government must respect the peculiar
role of the other”.160 Another institutional diversity of sources to be brought
into harmony lies in the distinction between judicial and administrative law.
“That results in a multi-layered dialogue”, the Chief Justice explains: “From
their different vantage points, the institutional actors … play their
parts”.161 Like other skilful judges, Chief Justice McLachlin was also adept
at integrating important legal sources lying outside branches of
government, including the academy, law reform commissions, and other
authorities. Meanwhile, she excelled in her appreciation of the social
facts in which the law is embedded and inextricable — in her phrase,
“this complex mix of rules, practices and values that we call the law”.162
2. Legal Orders
Certain legal problems implicate distinct legal orders. This is another
dimension which the legal problem-solving strategy of striving for
harmony may be applied to.
One example of this application has been to enhance harmony in the
relationship between federal and provincial jurisdiction. The principle of
157
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“co-operative federalism” gained favour in the McLachlin Court as a
way to “facilitate interlocking federal and provincial legislative
schemes”.163 With flexibility tempering the rigidity and crudeness of the
doctrines of paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity, it is thus
possible to “avoid blocking the application of measures … enacted in
furtherance of the public interest”.164
Harmony also characterizes attending to the relationship between
domestic and international law. As McLachlin C.J.C. summarized in a
recent case: “legislation is presumed to comply with Canada’s international
obligations, and courts should avoid interpretations that would violate
those obligations. Courts must also interpret legislation in a way that
reflects the values and principles of customary and conventional
international law”.165 Under her tenure, the Court has also made important
use of Comparative Law, achieving a certain level of harmony with foreign
law dealing with parallel issues.166
As far as orders corresponding to different legal traditions, discussed
already have been the examples of the Harmonization Acts between
federal common law and Quebec civil law,167 as well as efforts to
reconcile European and Aboriginal-American legal traditions, still very
much a work-in-progress due to the challenge, as the Chief Justice notes,
that “Indigenous ideas about justice may differ radically from the
adversarial and punishment-focused approaches we see in our courts”.168
In former times, court justice and administrative justice were seen as
on different planes; however, these too have taken strides in the
McLachlin Court — sometimes spurred by the Chief Justice — towards
a more harmonious relationship.169 As she confirms: “the choice is not
between either the rule of law or administrative discretion, and the issue
is not the extent to which the ‘law’ represented by the courts, should curb
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administrative discretion … the real question: how can we achieve
optimum decision-making in terms of quality and efficiency in both the
legal and administrative fields?”170
A harmonious relationship has also been sought between the supreme
law of the Constitution and the ordinary law subject to it by virtue of
constitutional review. Given that failure in this carries risks of charges of
judicial activism on one hand, or abdication of constitutional duty on the
other, this has not been an easy task. As Chief Justice McLachlin reflects,
“it was delicate work. It required judges to balance interests and calibrate
outcomes in a way that was both respectful of the role of elected
legislators and administrators on the one hand, and true to the country’s
constitutional guarantees on the other”.171 Prior to her retirement, she
even projected:
The most fundamental challenge for the judiciary in the years to come —
one without which all other efforts will fail — is to maintain the proper
constitutional balance between the judiciary on the one hand and the
legislative and executive branches of governance on the other. This is a
task in which all branches of governance must engage. Each branch
must understand its role and respect the roles of the other.172

3. Perspectives
Every case involves a diverse set of legitimate perspectives on the
resolution of the problem it presents. The harmony-seeking framework
also applies to this dimension of a case.
To begin with are the perspectives of the case actors contemplated by
the system. In an appellate court, this includes the bench. Even before a
panel is struck, the approach may be operative. For example, McLachlin
C.J.C. was noted for preferring to have all nine judges sit on cases where
possible.173 The process from then on, far from being intelligible as
comprising individual judicial decisions and “voting”, is rather a
complex matter of striving to compose judges’ different perspectives.
Puisne justices confirm that, on the McLachlin Court, judicial case
conferences were “comprehensive” in scope, with a high “level of
deliberation”.174 Deliberation as a “professional responsibility requires
170
171
172
173
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them to lay out both their own position and the defects they see in their
colleagues’ positions … with respect and civility”,175 so that their
“collective knowledge” can generate better judgments.176 Her successor as
chief justice, Richard Wagner, summarized, “we, on this bench, help each
other do better, and help this institution do better”.177
As McLachlin C.J.C. explains, the process does not end there:
Writing reasons is a continuation of the process of deliberation. The
justice writing wrestles with the legal and sometimes factual problems
the case presents, and when the first draft is sent out, other justices
offer comments, criticisms and suggestions for improvement. The
product that finally emerges after innumerable redrafts often looks
quite different than what we envisioned around the conference table.178

The product that emerges will not always be consensus. Justices of
the McLachlin Court report that there was “widespread agreement with
the view” of the aim being a “blend of individuality and collegiality”; as
one put it, “I try to remind myself that we are not just soloists, but
instead are members of a choir”.179
Judicial conclusions are informed, in turn, by the perspectives brought
by the parties and by the evidence they adduce based on their perspectives.
The views of others involved in the case play a part as well. As Chief
Justice McLachlin describes:
We read the judgments below. We look at critical pieces of evidence.
We study the written briefs of the parties and interveners. Usually, we
ask one of our law clerks for a memo outlining all the arguments and
possible dispositions. When we walk into the courtroom for the
hearing, we know all about the case. Our minds, however, are open. We
need to listen to the parties and interveners and ask them the questions
that are troubling us.180

Beyond the case actors that the system recognizes, society comprises
individuals and groups with different outlooks (political, philosophical,
religious, etc.) — representing another consideration that may need to be
taken into account in meeting the challenge of legitimation and in
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respecting multiculturalism.181 The Chief Justice explains that “a multiplicity
of worldviews grounded in alternative sources of authority does not
necessarily threaten the rule of law, but rather strengthens and completes
public life and discourse”.182 In order for each view to be heard by the
legal system without overwhelming it, the judge must be their mediator.
As Chief Justice McLachlin says, “the judge must become the one who
understands every voice”,183 and must be able to compose and conduct
them towards the overall goal of a just order. This, she observes,
“provides a way to reconcile the moral opinions of divergent groups,
within the context of the fundamental constitutional morality upon which
the society as a whole rests”.184
But it is not all about difference. She explains that “while we may
find no consensus on values and conceptions of the good in the narrow
sense, the reality is that we hold much in common as human beings.
Searching for this commonality brings us to share deeper values, basic
principles which should govern our interaction”.185 Through this search,
“case by case, we define and reinforce the common space that unites
us”,186 with room to recognize our “shared humanity” and “shared
values”.187
4. Case-Specific Interests
The legal problem at the heart of a case embraces multiple legitimate
interests. These may include individual, group, and societal interests
where implicated by a case. Resolving these issues by striving for
harmony among legitimate considerations is an approach that certainly
applies to this dimension of a problem. Given the Supreme Court of
Canada’s comprehensive jurisdiction, and the span of the Chief Justice’s
engagement with it, examples could be offered in almost any area. A few
suffice by way of illustration.
A first example comes from the Law of Evidence. R. v. Khan
concerned a doctor’s alleged sexual assault of a young child unfit to
181
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testify, whose telling of the incident to her mother was excluded as
hearsay.188 Justice McLachlin (as she then was) framed the legal problem
thus: “The question then is the extent to which, if at all, the strictures of
the hearsay rule should be relaxed in the case of children’s testimony”.189
Besides fair trial rights, she identified as other factors the frequency of
such offences, the risk of obstructing their prosecution, and forcing
children to relive trauma in giving evidence.190 The rigidity of the rule
and its exceptions being insufficient to address these, McLachlin J. found
harmony among them through “two general requirements: necessity and
reliability”, reflecting “the principle and the policy underlying the
hearsay rule”.191 This resolution has formed a cornerstone in the
development of the Canadian Law of Evidence.192
A second example, drawn from Tort Law, concerns when employers
should be vicariously liable for intentional torts committed by their
employees. In Bazley, McLachlin J. found the existing rule — the second
arm of the Salmond Test, which asks whether the tort was an “unauthorized
mode of performing an authorized act” — to be indeterminate, comprising
“artificial or semantic distinctions”.193 She identified as appropriate
considerations: effective compensation for victims, deterrence of
future harm, and fairness in holding employers responsible.194 Harmony
among these interests was achieved through the principle of enterprise
risk: in this case providing that “employers may justly be held liable
where the act falls within the ambit of the risk that the employer’s
enterprise [materially] creates or exacerbates”.195 The harmony achieved
by this resolution has since resonated in common law courts around
the world.196
National Security Law provides a third example. Chief Justice
McLachlin rejects the reductionism of framing the relationship between
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the values as strictly a conflict between rights and security.197 She quotes
President of the Supreme Court of Israel Aharon Barak that “individual
liberties constitute an important component of … security”, of what a
country governed by the Rule of Law seeks to secure.198 At the same time,
without security, there can be no rights. Different values, she notes, may
therefore have an “intercourse” that confounds the assumption of
discreteness upon which the balancing approach rests.199 Thus, in Charkaoui
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),200 she struck down parts of the
government’s security certificate regime, which violated basic legal rights
guaranteed by the Charter; for instance, secret government evidence
impeded rights to know and answer the case against one.201 But to avoid
leaving security unprotected, she sought harmony by temporarily suspending
the declaration of invalidity, while noting that measures such as special
advocates to review secret evidence on behalf of detainees might comply
with the Charter.202 Federal legislation was amended accordingly, and when
subsequently challenged, was found to be constitutionally valid.203
A fourth example pertains to proportionality as the framework for
assessing whether rights limitations are justified under section 1 of the
Charter.204 Proportionality centres around a balancing test — actually two
balancing tests, as the Chief Justice clarified in Hutterian Brethren.205 Yet,
what is interesting is how McLachlin C.J.C. sees the conflict inherent in
that exercise as again dwelling within a larger harmony. Evoking the “cooperative approach” to federalism, she uses the word “interlocking” to
describe the “rights and responsibilities of the individual and the state”
balanced through proportionality.206 Indeed, they are inseparable: “For all
the celebrated individualism of recent decades, human beings are social
beings. ‘A person only becomes a person through other people,’ proclaims
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the African aphorism”.207 She judges, in fact, that “Canada’s history
demonstrates a commitment to a positive partnership between the state and
the individual, between the private interest and the public good … .
Historically, we have tended to view rights, not as threatened by, but as
existing in harmony with collective rights”.208 This distinctive
“Cooperative Charter” theory is reflected in her jurisprudence, evident for
example in cases like: Khawaja, where she upheld legislation implicating
several freedoms but tailored to accommodate them;209 Nur, where she
struck down legislation that made no such effort;210 and Hutterian
Brethren, where she rejected a claim in which government attempts at
accommodation were declined by the claimants who required a resolution
that went beyond allowing reasonable government options.211
Her broader interpretation of the Charter reprises a similar theme,
evoking harmony:
In my view, the uniquely Canadian character of the Charter is reflected
in its emphasis on three kinds of rights: individual rights, tied to a
conception of tolerance and respect; collective interests, bound up with
an appreciation of the relationship of support and obligation between
individual and community; and group rights, tied to a recognition that
pluralism is one of Canada’s animating values.
The Charter reconciles these three types of rights, not as contending
forces balanced precariously against each other in basic opposition, but
as complementary rights, drawing strength and support from each other.
This, I think, is the Charter’s defining characteristic. And, to the extent
this is so, it resonates with Canadians’ conception of themselves.212

5. General Regulatory Interests
Besides the interests specific to a given case, almost every legal problem
involves interests associated with the law’s general societal function, which
also may be orchestrated to achieve a harmonious resolution. These include
considerations of legality (consistency, predictability, intelligibility, etc.) and
of good governance (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, adaptability, etc.).
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Here, the aforementioned “tests” for which Chief Justice McLachlin
is beloved among law students are a remarkable manifestation of the
philosophy of seeking harmony. They tend to embody “principles-based
regulation” — that is, high-level standards that guide rather than displace
the judgment of front-line decision-makers.213 This form of regulation
has been validated in many contexts for its capacity to deliver on
multiple good governance objectives.214 Simultaneously, applied in this
context by Chief Justice McLachlin, it achieves harmony among
important interests of legality.
The tests’ multiple parts are an incarnation of the compound and
complex way in which the Chief Justice deploys principles-based
regulatory techniques: Often, a primary “rule” directly embodies an
overarching policy consideration, which is then complemented by a finite
enumerated list of secondary factors. The secondary factors tend to either:
(a) concretize the application of the abstract primary principle in various
factual contexts (thus serving as presumptive quasi-rules); or (b) incorporate
secondary but important policy considerations; or (c) encapsulate fact-based
or principle-based exceptions to the general rule.
In terms of interests of legality, casting governing rationes in this way
can self-evidently be seen to allow substantial predictability and flexibility.
Moreover, it integrates adaptability and stability, by anticipating concrete
fact-driven incremental elaboration and evolution of the law, and infusing
it within a guiding conceptual rational-universalism. Bazley, discussed
earlier, illustrates this. Besides the primary principle already detailed,215
McLachlin J. added:
(3) In determining the sufficiency of the connection between the
employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk and the wrong
complained of, subsidiary factors may be considered. These may
vary with the nature of the case. When related to intentional torts,
the relevant factors may include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to
abuse his or her power;
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the
employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been
committed by the employee);
213
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(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction,
confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer’s
enterprise;
(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to
the victim;
(e) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of
the employee’s power.216

Beyond the terms of the test itself, her typical non-exhaustive style of
articulation preserves a residue of judicial discretion to accommodate the
emergence of unanticipated new policy concerns. Meanwhile, on the
other hand, McLachlin J. states that the test applies “where precedent is
inconclusive”, thus encouraging legal certainty and consistency of
adjudication as precedent accumulates.217
In these ways, the “McLachlin multi-part tests” may also, from a
Comparative Law perspective, be hypothesized as pursuing harmony in
the two main influences on Canadian common law — viz., by combining
the characteristic strengths, and avoiding the characteristic weaknesses,
of the contrasting stereotypes of English legal formalism and American
open-ended policy reasoning.218 Chief Justice McLachlin resisted
extremes of either. For instance, R. v. Jordan’s numeric rendition of the
right to be tried in a reasonable time is a crude example in Canada of the
rigid-rule tack. In that case, the Chief Justice joined Cromwell J.’s sharp
rebuke of the majority approach as “wrong in principle and unwise in
practice”.219 Conversely, in R. v. Labaye, the Chief Justice rejected as
excessively subjective the Supreme Court of Canada’s prior reliance on
“community standards of tolerance” to decide criminal indecency.220
6. In Leadership in Law
Cases and other legal problems are decided within an institutional,
professional, civic, and international context by which they are
influenced and which they reciprocally influence. Harmony as a
philosophy of legal problem-solving is also applicable to the dimension
216
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consisting of this broader context. Far more than in any previous era,
during the tenure of Beverley McLachlin the role of Chief Justice of
Canada carried with it an enormous array of leadership duties, both
substantive and symbolic.221 Across the several contexts cited, her
leadership characteristically exemplified successful application of a
harmonious approach.
The most immediate context is her institutional leadership of the
Supreme Court. Based on interviews with her fellow justices, Macfarlane
adjudges that “there is no doubt that the whole environment of decisionmaking is influenced at an important level on the Court by the chief
justice”.222 This is so through a blend of practical matters, such as the
Chief Justice assigning judgment writing responsibilities, and
metaphysical matters, such as the cultivation of organizational culture.
Of the latter, Macfarlane finds that the McLachlin Court “is driven by
norms of consensus and collegiality. These norms so infuse the process
of decision-making at the Court that in any given year, a majority of the
cases are resolved on a unanimous basis”.223 He adds that the ideological
model of judicial decision-making, which commonly explains the
behaviour of other courts, “cannot account for the high degree of
collegiality” on the McLachlin Court.224
In order to function harmoniously as intended by its collegiate design,
an appellate court requires collegiality among the members.225 Chief
Justice McLachlin made a “concerted effort to foster collegiality”,226 and
Chief Justice Wagner has since credited her “strong leadership” as a
reason for the collegiality for which the Supreme Court of Canada has
become known.227 Justice Louis LeBel, the longest-serving member of
the McLachlin Court, concluded that she was “quite successful in
preventing what happened in other courts — the court splitting into
different groups and clans”.228 Some of the ways she accomplished this
221
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were deceivingly simple, such as having a single small table in the
judges’ dining room, so that they would share lunch together. If she was
proactive in preventing conflict on the bench, she was equally aggressive
in diffusing it.229 Her intolerance of disharmony was sufficiently
respected that, on a rare occasion where sharp words were exchanged in
competing draft judgments during her absence on other official business,
those phrases suddenly vanished just as the Chief Justice’s plane touched
down on her return to Ottawa.
Appellate courts’ collegiate constitution, as well as vocation of
rendering the law clear and coherent, also makes consensus another
measure of institutional harmony. McCormick remarks that Chief Justice
McLachlin attached “real importance to a more unified court”.230 This
was buttressed by her belief that “nothing meaningful could happen
without consensus from everyone involved”.231 Certainly, consensus’
strength creates solidity which enhances sustainability. Hence, colleagues
described, “she may … find ways of reconciling divergent views”.232
That, and other methods described in Section II.2, “sometimes led to
consensus that didn’t exist initially”, as Donald Songer found; consensus
was not “the state of nature”, but a quality “gradually emerging” from the
institutional processes of the McLachlin Court.233
Regarding writing assignments, Chief Justice McLachlin eschewed a
singular approach based on seniority, and again sought to harmoniously
combine several considerations (preferences, workload, regional
representation, expertise, etc.) in a way that would best serve the Court
docket as a whole.
In the professional and civic contexts too, the Chief Justice exhibited
harmony in tending to legal problem-solving. As reflected in the oftrepeated remark that she took less time to rise to the Supreme Court than
most cases heard by the Court,234 the legal system’s overwhelming
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problems of access to justice call for bold action. Recognizing that all
stakeholders would need to act in concert for meaningful change to
occur, her vision was to “bring together a collaborative, wide-ranging,
and nationally diverse group that represents as many aspects of and
voices in the civil and family justice system as possible”.235 Another
problem in the legal profession, and with a particularly adverse impact
on women with child care responsibilities, is its culture of workaholism.236
The Chief Justice, having the most onerous array of responsibilities
(adjudicative, executive, public and foreign representative, etc.) in the
profession, but also autonomy over how to execute them, led by
example, practising what she preached: “you have to train yourself to get
away for periods of time, whether it’s a weekend at a cottage, a day in
the garden, or a few hours … being outdoors and taking long walks”.237
This was not a question of balance, of sacrifices, as commonly framed;
again, in Chief Justice McLachlin’s view, the work sphere as well as the
other spheres (family, personal, culture, nature, etc.) mutually benefit
from a harmonious relationship among them.
In the international context, Chief Justice McLachlin saw clearly how
the harmony of Canadian law, mirrored in Canada’s harmonious relations
in a globalized world, made it attractive to other countries, creating the
opportunity of leadership in their seeking to strengthen their own legal
systems: “Canada has no colonial past, and global strategic plan, and is
not a threat to anyone. For this reason, it can be a model. And in my
experience, when Canadians speak of the institutions that foster
tolerance, inclusion, and respect for human rights, many around the
world are willing to listen. We must continue to speak, and we must
continue to be heard”.238 Although past the age of retirement from the
Supreme Court of Canada, she will continue this leadership part-time in
the Far East, where harmony is already a force.239
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V. HARMONY’S POTENTIAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL
TO BEVERLEY MCLACHLIN
In making the case in this article that Chief Justice McLachlin’s
resolution of legal problems was characterized by addressing issues in a
way that pursued harmony among the legitimate considerations involved,
the question naturally arises of what might have led her to such an
approach?
Ultimately, she is the best judge of the experiences and thinking
behind the philosophies that she employed. To date, her discussions of
the task have used the term harmony less commonly than related but
better-known terms such as balance, weaving a fabric, etc., which, being
conventional, arouse less curiosity. Nonetheless, even a cursory glance at
well-known aspects of her experience allow us to hazard a few possible
hypotheses.
For starters, I would suggest that it may be no coincidence that the
approach seeking harmony is perfected by a Canadian. Mirroring the
country’s international reputation, the Chief Justice has been described as
“measured” and a calming influence.240 With a historically small
population, Canada has been shaped by the confluent influences of its
Indigenous roots, its English and French political parentage, and its
global superpower neighbour. To survive and mature as a nation, it has
had to achieve not merely balance, but a harmony among this set of
sources and forces. Canada’s legal culture is no exception. Add to that
the federal nature of the Constitution, plus the bijuralism of the nation’s
European legal heritage, and the complexity of the challenge is clear. The
Chief Justice summarizes: “in short, Canada is one of the most
complicated, diverse countries” in the Western world.241 From that
perspective, it is perhaps no surprise that this mode of resolution was
conducted with so much sophistication by Beverley McLachlin.
It seems to me likely also no coincidence to see this philosophy
blossom by the efforts of a woman. Feminist literature suggests that
“men and women approach moral and ethical dilemmas from different
vantage points”.242 Women are firstly said to place greater emphasis on
respect and empathy — correspondent with the initial stage of the
harmony-seeking process, namely, acknowledgment of the legitimate
240
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interests involved. Second, women are described as being “much more
interested in trying to strengthen social relationships ... grounded in the
assumption that self and others are interdependent”.243 This echoes the
latter stage of the harmony-seeking process, wherein the various
constituents are orchestrated with a view to the relationships among them
and to the whole composed of them. Cynthia Ostberg and Matthew
Wetstein conclude that Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach “parallels
nicely with the themes articulated in feminist literature — that women
seek to foster meaningful relationships between individuals and
[between] groups, and are more interested than men in promoting
community bonds and commitments to others”.244 While claims of that
kind are inevitably generalizations, and to that extent oversimplifications,
the broad pattern is sufficient at least for feminism to reasonably lay some
claim to womanhood as a factor in the Chief Justice’s proficiency at
these tasks. Moreover, beyond interpersonal and intergroup relationships,
the same harmony-seeking feature in her work extends as between the
various interests that affect people, as discussed in Part IV.
More particular aspects of Beverley McLachlin’s background may
also be factors. She was raised in a small town where family was a key
institution and the community in some ways an extended family.245 The
highly religious environment was a strong influence on her moral and
ethical formation.246 As discussed in Part I.1, family and religion are
normative spheres in which harmony has a high profile. Harmony would
also constitute a recurring ideal within her pre-law formation in
Philosophy, extending (in the West) from Plato’s Ethics to Kant’s
Aesthetics.247 Of course, harmony also governs music — noted as being
for Chief Justice McLachlin a lifelong passion248 — “music has always
been part of my life”: growing up, her family had a band that played the
country fairs, while other relatives sang opera or religious hymns, and
she herself was in the school choir.249 Harmony must also have played a
role in how she remarkably found a way to preserve an integral sense of
self in young adulthood — a “farm girl” suddenly living in the big city,
243
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working as a journalist, studying philosophy and law, with mostly men
for peers in those years, then later raising a child while seamlessly
navigating a varied and fast-rising career in the legal profession.250

EPILOGUE
Conclusion
Striving to resolve legal problems in a way that gives the legitimate
considerations involved harmonious collective expression is one of the
hallmarks of Chief Justice McLachlin’s resoundingly successful career.
Her genius at achieving this took shape in countless examples in her
roles as judge, jurist, and civic leader. Each of these provides an
invaluable model for others charged in the future with similar functions
to look to in tackling their own responsibilities. Greater consciousness of
what was characteristic of her vision of the judicious resolution of legal
problems, and a clearer conceptual account of the aim as well as the
process, may help those interested in pursuing this. To try to assist in that
has been this article’s aspiration.
Final Thoughts
Might there be wider significance to this distinctive feature of Chief
Justice McLachlin’s approach, in meeting the challenges emergent in our
society now and into the future? Part I.1 observed that harmony’s
centrality to aspirations of just order in cultures across the world and
over history was shared by the Western world’s “official” legal systems,
yet sharply attenuated in practice by their exclusion of a distinct role for
harmony, recognized by and operating within the system as a guiding
concept in working out the proper relationship among other elements and
the whole, as part of resolving the rules’ insufficiencies. Yet, harmony
was noted to fulfil this customary role in Western “unofficial legal
systems”, family and religion.251 Throughout Western history, it is the
latter that have been the dominant cultural forces. It is only in recent
decades — the era roughly contemporaneous with Beverley McLachlin’s
adulthood — that this changed, with the societal breakdown of the family
250

Kickstart, supra, note 237.
I use the phrase “unofficial legal systems” (not uncritically) again from a legal pluralist
standpoint: see supra, note 39.
251

(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d)

JUSTICE AS HARMONY

61

and religious exodus in the West. Since then, the official legal system’s
scope of engagement has expanded, together with expectations that it do
more than decide disputes among persons or between persons and the
state; there has been a belief that it can and should strive, in the most
general sense, for justice in social terms and at a community level —
formerly preoccupations of family and religion.252 In that new reality
where Western official law became responsible for pursuing the just
order no longer in such a limited sense but in a much more
comprehensive sense, the indissociable imperative of harmony had to
survive as a distinct guiding principle this same transmigration.
And yet, at the time of the present writing, the West is witness to
unprecedented social disintegration, a civil “culture war” over relative
preferences among legitimate policy considerations,253 and historic
lows of public trust in organizations and institutions with consequent
suffering in society as a whole.254 While these phenomena have many
causes, the common responsibility for their solution belongs to the
law, whose duty the preservation of harmony had become.255 Thus,
phenomena like these powerfully evince the overwhelming failure of
the law to do so.
In an age where ideas know no borders, Canada is not immune to
such trends. But thus far, the country has tried harder to resist them than
many places. I submit that this is thanks in part to Chief Justice
McLachlin and the McLachlin Court’s concern for harmony in Canadian
law, and the stewardship that orientation has provided to Canadian
society. If this is so, her insight and skill may indeed be of wider
significance in navigating the future of Western society.
The Chief Justice proclaims: “Nothing is more important than justice
and the just society. It is essential to the flourishing of men, women and
children and to maintaining social stability and security”.256 The question
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is how do we achieve that? Outside the Supreme Court of Canada, stands
Lady Justice, who relies on scales of balance, a depiction of our legal
tradition’s past. For a generation, inside the Supreme Court of Canada,
sat Lady Chief Justice McLachlin, pursuing harmony, a model for our
legal tradition’s future.

